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B.A./M.A. Research Seminar

## **COMPARATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS**

300.545 (2SSt SE, WS 2014/15) 8 ECTS

Tuesdays 11h00-13h00 PR115B

### **COURSE DESCRIPTION**

Elections are the central and defining feature of democracy. While much electoral research focuses on voting behavior, a significant portion of research evaluates electoral systems as systemic variables. This class will focus the latter perspective. Electoral systems are a crucial link in the chain connecting the preferences of citizens to governments; they also represent some of the most powerful instruments which undergird power sharing arrangements in democracies.

The purposes of this seminar is to introduce some of the major theoretical and conceptual building blocks concerning electoral institutions, the types, the emergence, changes, effects and related measurement. After an overview of election laws and election systems around the world, we will evaluate how electoral systems influence party systems, representation, citizen attitudes and behavior, the quality of democracy, and electoral misconduct. The course will proceed thematically, with participants discussing a subset of the pertinent scholarly literature every week. Discussion should focus on a major theoretical or empirical controversy. Key methodological issues are addressed the context of each theme: the emphasis will be placed on causality and finding out what makes for good and convincing arguments.

Class will meet every Tuesday from 11h00 to 13h00 in Room PR115B starting on 07.10.2013 until 27.01.2014. The seminar and its evaluation will be conducted in English. I will make all the materials you will need for this course on the portal blackboard, within the limits of legality, of course.

*Sprechstunde:*

TBA

### **COURSE SCHEDULE**

1. October 7: Introduction/Types of Electoral Systems
2. October 14: The Number of Political Parties I
3. October 21: The Number of Political Parties II
4. October 28: Electoral System Origins/Reform
5. November 4: Descriptive Representation I
6. November 11: Descriptive Representation II
7. November 18: Substantive Representation
8. November 25: Centripetal vs. Centrifugal effects
9. December 2: Citizen Behavior and Attitudes
10. December 9: Mixed Electoral Systems
11. December 16: Strategic Voting and Entry
12. January 13: Intra-Party Competition/Legislative Behavior
13. January 20: Fraud/corruption
14. January 27: Electoral System Design for new democracies

## **COURSE REQUIREMENTS**

The following is required of all students enrolled in this course:

- 1) To attend all class meetings;
- 2) To do all required readings;
- 3) To participate actively in the class discussions;
- 4) To prepare and hand-in weekly short reviews of the readings
- 5) To select by November 6, one of 3 tracks; (either a series of short papers, a thesis research design, or a classical research paper).

Grade breakdown:

- Participation: 30%
- Weekly handouts: 10%
- Track option total: 60%

### ***About the Readings***

Attendance is obligatory, and each student is expected to actively participate in the weekly seminars (participation counts for 30% for your grade, so keep that in mind. If you do all the work and do not talk during the seminar, your grade cannot be higher than 3). If you miss one meeting, you will have to write a two-page summary of the seminar literature of this class including some of the non-required readings. In case you miss more than three seminars you will not pass the course. Every week's session will entail a discussion of the readings; hence you need to prepare for each session and be ready to discuss the texts in details. Take notes, look up words and concepts you are not familiar with, look at references in the text and consult other material cited and suggested by me. You should plan to spend at least a working day to prepare a session. Most important, you should bring 2-3 questions you would like to debate in class with your peers; this ensures a lively in-class experience.

The reading load for this course might seem heavy at first sight. I have selected sections from a various amount of articles and books to cover topics in order to permit interesting comparisons and some disagreement on certain issues. Remember that *skimming* is an important professional skill.

MA students: must read all required readings (and make sure they master the ° texts)

BA students: must read the readings marked with \* and browse the ° which include "catch up" readings on the texts which you will need to understand the research literature.

### To prepare for the seminar you should think about:

- How the readings fit together; what unites them;
- What are the main debates, puzzles? What are the main hypotheses defended by the authors? Are there sub-hypotheses?
- What are the main variables? What is the theoretical argument that links the variables? Is there a theory?
- What level of analysis is used? (Micro or macro) Ask yourself who performs the action: people, voters, elites, political parties, institutions, society, states, or other (social) structures?
- What kind of method is each of the authors employing? (Case studies, comparison of many cases, qualitative, quantitative, a mix of methods)
- Are the empirical findings robust? Are you convinced? Why/Why not?
- Taking all the readings together, are the findings unanimous, or split about an issue?
- Are the different arguments to explain a phenomenon reconcilable?
- Why do you think findings are split? Do authors use different methods, variables, countries, years, definitions, to arrive at their findings?
- Overall, what do we know about a topic? Which variables are at work?
- What is there still to know about a topic?

- What is most convincing: the theory or the empirical findings?
- Are there things you might have not understood?
- What are the normative underpinnings?

### **Weekly Short Reviews**

**(MA Students one each week, BA students = 6)**

These should be concise reviews of the current week's reading. Keep them to one page, single-spaced maximum. Your short reviews do not need to be in a continuous text form, they can be a series of points. These are due in class each week, beginning on October 9. Because they are meant to encourage you to think about the readings before you come to class, no late reviews will be accepted.

In your reviews, you should:

1. Summarize the main arguments of the readings for the week. What are the readings about? How do they relate to each other? (Keep this part short – half of the page, maximum)
2. Critique the readings – consider methodology, logic, biases, omissions, etc. Do the authors prove what they propose convincingly? Why or why not?
3. Identify some questions that you would like to discuss in class.

### **TRACK 1:**

**Master students: 6 Discussion Papers + Discussion leadership**

**BA students: 4 Discussion Papers + Discussion leadership**

#### *Discussion Leadership*

You will serve as the class discussion leader once during the semester. After I give a short, general overview of the week's topic, we will discuss the readings individually. You will briefly (in 2-3 minutes) introduce each reading by reminding the class of the author's main argument and the method(s) he/she uses to support that argument. Then you will lead the discussion by raising questions about the readings. Think of this as an extension of your one-page review – deal with the same issues, but in more detail.

#### *Discussion papers*

Six papers of 6-8 pages each about **4** of the weekly readings (your pick among required or recommended). The papers should be literature reviews of the readings with a twist. That is, they present a sketch of the major theories (explanations) and the results of your own assessment, focused around a question of your choice (think about something to really unite the readings to a common theme). Some of the best examples of this type of literature review of several books appear in *World Politics* and *The Annual Review of Political Science*. You may want to look at some of the review essays before you write your own. You should address the 3 following points.

- 1) What are the authors trying to demonstrate? Summarize the arguments using the following criteria:
  - a. What are the main hypotheses defended by the authors? Are there sub-hypotheses?
  - b. What are the main variables? What is the theoretical argument that links the variables?
  - c. What level of analysis is used? (Micro or macro) Who performs the action: people, institutions, states?
  - d. What is the type of analysis used (Deductive/inductive)
  - e. What kind of method is the author employing? (Case studies, comparison of many cases, qualitative, quantitative, a mix of methods)

2) Evaluate the theory: are these pieces of literature convincing? Below are some examples of evaluation criteria to help you make your point. You don't need to deal with all these items at once, just those you feel are relevant to your argument.

- a. Originality: new findings? New theory?

- b. Simplicity/parsimony (uses many or few variables to make a point?)
- c. Coherent/internally consistent (no propositions that contradict each other)
- d. pertinent/useful (you can apply this to real world cases)
- e. Predictive (you can make predictions using this theory, and if the predictions coming from it are validated by facts)
- f. Is this generalizable to many cases/countries, or just applicable to a single/few cases?
- g. Does it seem normative or objective? (Do the authors speak about how things are in the real world, or how things should be?)
- h. Are the variables adequately conceptualized and operationalized? Are the concepts clear? Were the measures chosen to evaluate concepts adequate?
- i. Was the choice of design acceptable, or could you recommend a better way to test the theory?

3) What links the articles together? Which of the theories proposed is most adequate and why, at least with respect to the question you have posed. Keep in mind that mature scholarship asks not so much whether someone is right or wrong but under what kinds of circumstances a theory is useful...

Papers are due no later than class time. I cannot accept late papers because that would put those who complied with the deadline at a disadvantage (e.g. after the class discussion on the topic). If you think you will fail to meet the deadline, then you should plan to submit a later paper. You have control over which papers you choose to write, and that flexibility should be sufficient to make sure you plan your schedule so that all your deadlines do not coincide. You should write at least one paper before November 4.

### **TRACK 2: Research Design (60%) DEADLINE: FEBRUARY 27 2015**

Write a research design for a study related to the comparative analysis of electoral institutions. You should only pick this option if you are actually planning to write your thesis in this field. The research design should be written in the form of a thesis proposal and should include the following aspects:

1. A brief discussion of your proposed thesis' substantive importance; Why is resolving this question important?
2. A brief and purposive review of the relevant literature. Your review should set up the question and demonstrate the need for research of the type you are proposing (so not just a laundry list of what is out there, see above for tips);
3. A clear and concise presentation of your thesis and outline of your theoretical framework. This includes the specification of the dependent and independent variables (definition, operationalization and measurement if applicable);
4. Specification of the theory's principal (testable) hypotheses: explain the theory, or the rationale, that links your independent to the dependent variables;
5. Discussion of your case selection if applicable. Why these countries/years?
6. Discussion of data that you plan to collect, or use, and the method you are proposing to employ (try to be as concrete as possible).
7. Discuss limitations of your reliance on the cases and the data you will use. Acknowledge what kinds of evidence would disconfirm your hypotheses, also, the limitations of your research design in general. Can you really demonstrate causality? Why not?

For this option, you should submit a proposal for this research design by **November 25**.

### **TRACK 3: Research Paper (60%) FEBRUARY 27 2015**

Write an original research paper on an already reasonably well-designed research proposal. The topic should be directly related to this course. The structure of the research paper should be modeled on an academic article from a peer-reviewed journal, with about 20-25 pages (12pt font, 1.5 spaced). It is important that you ask and try to answer a clearly stated question.

For this option, you should submit a proposal for this research design by November 25.

### **LATE PAPER POLICY**

I understand that printers break, dogs/uncles/grandmas sometimes die, and hard drives often fail around final paper due dates. I will accept late final papers, but each late day will cost you 5% of your grade. (Weekly review papers cannot be handed in late for the above cited reasons).

### **PLAGIARISM**

A note on plagiarism. Full citations must be included for every source you utilize, including those you paraphrase even loosely. Citations must be included if you paraphrase another author, or if you use another's ideas, even if not the exact words. You should select a standard citation style and stick to it. Lifting papers from the internet will be punished by a failing grade and reported to the appropriate authorities. (ps. I check).

### **COURSE READINGS AND CONTENT:**

The required literature is meant for MA students. The required literature for BA students is marked with an \*. The catch up literature is marked with °

### **COURSE READINGS**

#### **WEEK 1 (October 7): Introduction/ Identifying Types of Electoral Systems**

##### Required readings:

- \*Norris, Pippa. 2004. *Electoral Engineering. Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Chapter 2, pp.39-66).
- \*Golder, Matt. 2005. Democratic Electoral Systems around the World, 1946-2000. *Electoral Studies* 24:103-121.
- Farrell, David M. 2011. *Electoral Systems. A Comparative Introduction*. Palgrave, (chapters 1-6, pp.1-152)

##### Recommended (but not required):

- International IDEA. *Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook*, chapters 2-3 (pp. 27-118)  
<http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/>
- Gallagher, Michael. 1992. Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities. *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 22 (4): 46-496.
- Bowler, Shaun. 2008. "Electoral Systems". in Rhodes, R. A. W., Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*. Chapter 1 (pp.3-22).

#### **WEEK 2 (October 14): Electoral rules as causes: The Number of Parties I**

##### Required readings:

- \*Lijphart, Arend. 1990. "The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-1985". *American Political Science Review* 84: 481-496.
- \*Riker, William H. 1982. "The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science". *American Political Science Review* 76: 753-766.
- \*Dunleavy, Patrick. 2012. "Duverger's Law is a dead Parrot. European political scientists need to recognize that plurality or majority voting has no tendency at all to produce two party politics." *SE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog* (20 Jun 2012) Blog Entry.
- Benoit, Kenneth. 2006. "Duverger's Law and the Study of Electoral Systems". *French Politics* 4(1): 69-83.

##### Recommended (but not required)

- Norris, Pippa. 2004. *Electoral Engineering. Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Chapters 4-5, pp.81-125). A GREAT SUMMARY OF THE DEBATE.
- Duverger, Maurice. 1954. *Political Parties*. New York: Wiley [pp. 234-282].

- Rae, Douglas W. 1971. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. New York: Yale University Press [chapters 4 and 5].
- Benoit, Kenneth. 2002. "The Endogeneity Problem in Electoral Studies: A Critical Reexamination of Duverger's Mechanical Effect." *Electoral Studies* 21(1): 35–46.
- Johnston, Richard and Janet Ballantyne. 1977. "Geography and the Electoral System." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 10 (1977): 857-66.
- Bakvis, Herman and Laura G. Macpherson Quebec Block Voting and the Canadian Electoral System." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 28 (1995): 659-92.

### **WEEK 3 (October 21): Electoral rules as consequences: The Number of Parties II**

#### Required readings:

- \*Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*. S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds.). New York: The Free Press. pp. 1-64.
- \*Cox, Gary and Amorim Neto, Octavio. 1997. "Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 41(1):149-174.
- \*Clark, William, and Matt Golder. 2006. "Rehabilitating Duverger's Theory: Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws" *Comparative Political Studies* 39: 679-708.

#### Recommended (but not required)

- Norris, Pippa. 2004. *Electoral Engineering. Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Chapters 4-5, pp.81-125). A GREAT SUMMARY OF THE DEBATE.
- Ordeshook, P. and Shvetsova, O. (1994) 'Ethnic heterogeneity, district magnitude, and the number of parties', *American Journal of Political Science* 38(1): 100–123.
- Moser, Robert G. 1999. "Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States." *World Politics* 51(3): 539-384.

### **WEEK 4 (October 28): Investigating causality: Electoral System Origins/Reform**

#### Required readings:

- \*Boix, Carles. 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 93 (3): 609-24.
- \*Andrews, Josephine T., Jackman, Robert W. 2005. Strategic Fools: Electoral rule choice under Extreme Uncertainty. *Electoral Studies* 24:65-84.
- \*Benoit, Kenneth. 2007. Electoral Laws as Political Consequences: Explaining the Origins and Change of Electoral Institutions. *Annual Review of Political Science* 10(1): 363-390.
- Marcus Kreuzer. 2010. "Historical Knowledge and Quantitative Analysis: The Case of the Origins of Proportional Representation." *American Political Science Review* 104: 369-92, and replies by Cusack et al. and Boix.

#### Recommended (but not required):

- Norris, Pippa.1995. Introduction: The Politics of Electoral Reform. *International Political Science Review* 16(1):3-8.
- Farrell, David M. 2011. *Electoral Systems. A Comparative Introduction*. Palgrave, (chapter 8, pp.172-200).
- Dunleavy, Patrick, Margetts, Helen.1995. Understanding the Dynamics of Electoral Reform. *International Political Science Review* 16(1):9-29.
- Colomer, Joseph M. 2005. It's Parties that Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's Laws Upside Down). *Political Studies* 53:1-21.
- André Bais, Agnieszka Dobrzynska, and Indridi H. Indridason."To Adopt or Not to Adopt Proportional Representation: The Politics of Institutional Choice". *British Journal of Political Science* 35 (2004): 182 -190.
- Thomas R. Cusack, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems. 2007. *American Political Science Review* 101. 373 -91.

## **WEEK 5 (November 4): Descriptive Representation I:**

### Required readings:

- \*Kenworthy, Lane and Melissa Malami. 1999. "Gender Inequality in Political Representation" A Worldwide Comparative Analysis. *Social Forces* 78(1):235-268.
- \*Kittilson, Miki C., and Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer. 2012. *The Gendered Effects of Electoral Institutions. Political Engagement and Participation*. OUP (chapters 1, 5-6).
- \*Roberts, Andrew, Seawright, Jason, and Jennifer Cyr. 2013. "Do Electoral Laws Affect Women's Representation?" *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 46(12):1555-1581.
- Valdini, Melody. 2012. A Deterrent to Diversity: The conditional effect of electoral rules on the nomination of women candidates. 31(3):740-749.

### Recommended (but not required):

- Norris, Pippa. 2004. *Electoral Engineering. Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Chapter 8, pp.179-208).
- Fortin-Rittberger, J., & Rittberger, B. (2014). Do electoral rules matter? Explaining national differences in women's representation in the European Parliament. *European Union Politics*.
- Paxton, Pamela, Hughes, Melanie M. and Matthew A. Painter. 2010. Growth in Women's Political Representation: A Longitudinal Exploration of Democracy, Electoral System and Gender Quotas. *European Journal of Political Research* 49:25-52.
- Salmond, Rob. 2006. "Proportional Representation and Female Parliamentarians." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31(2): 175-204.
- Trebbi, F. Aghion P., and Alesina A. 2008. "Electoral Rules and Minority Representation in U.S. Cities" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* , 123 (1) pp. 325-357
- Dancygier, Rafaela M. 2014. "Electoral Rules or Electoral Leverage? Explaining Muslim Representation in England." *World Politics* 66(2):229-263.
- Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes'" *Journal of Politics*, vol. 61(3): 627-657.
- Phillips, Anne. 1995. *The Politics of Presence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pitkin, Hannah. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. University of California Press

## **WEEK 6 (November 11): Descriptive Representation II: Quotas, reserved seats**

### Required readings:

- \*Andrew Reynolds. 2005. "Reserved Seats in National Legislatures: A Research Note," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30(May): 301-10.
- \*Krook, Mona Lena, and Diana Z. O'Brien. 2010. "The Politics of Group Representation Quotas for Women and Minorities Worldwide." *Comparative Politics* 42(3):253-272.
- \*Bird, Karen. 2014. "Ethnic quotas and Ethnic Representation Worldwide." *International Political Science Review* 35(1): 12-26.
- Lublin, David, Matthew Wright. 2013. "Engineering Inclusion: Assessing the effects of Pro-minority Representation Policies" *Electoral Studies* 32(4):746-755.

### Recommended (but not required):

- Krook, Mona Lena. 2013. "Electoral Gender Quotas. A Conceptual Analysis." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(9): 1268-1293.
- Krook, Mona Lena, Pippa Norris. 2014. "Beyond Quotas: Strategies to Promote Gender Equality in Elected Office." *Political Studies*. 62(1):2-20.
- Special issue on "Quotas and Representation" 2014. *International Political Science Review* 35(1):3. In particular: Krook, Mona Lena, Par Zetterberg. 2014. "Electoral Quotas and Political Representation: Comparative Perspectives." *International Political Science Review* 35(1):3-11.
- Special Issue in *Representation* "Gender Quotas and Women's Representation: New Directions in Research" 2014 .vol. 50(3).
- Allen, Peter, David Cutts, and Rosie Campbell. 2014. "Measuring the Quality of Politicians Elected by Gender Quotas – Are they Any Different?" *Political Studies* (Forthcoming).

- Franceschet, Susan, Mona Lena Krook, Jennifer M. Piscopo. 2012. *The Impact of Gender Quotas*. Oxford University Press.
- Murray, Rainbow. 2010. "Second Among Unequals? A Study of Whether France's 'Quota Women' are Up to the Job." *Politics & Gender* 6(1):93-118.
- Murray, Rainbow. 2014. "Quotas for Men: Reframing Gender Quotas as a Means of Improving Representation for All." *American Political Science Review* 108(3): 520-532.

### **WEEK 7 (November 18): Substantive Representation: congruence**

#### Required readings:

- \*Huber, John D., and G. Bingham Power Jr. 1994. "Congruence between Citizens and Policy-Makers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy" *World Politics* 46(3):291-326.
- \*Blais, Andre, and Marc Andre Bodet. 2006. "Does Proportional Representation Foster Closer Congruence Between Citizens and Policy Makers?" *Comparative Political Studies* 39(10): 1243-62.
- Matt Golder & Jacek Stramski. 2010. "Ideological Congruence and Electoral Institutions." *American Journal of Political Science* 54: 90-106.
- \*Matt Golder & Gabriella Lloyd. 2014. "Re-evaluating the Relationship between Electoral Rules and Ideological Congruence." *European Journal of Political Research* (Forthcoming).

#### Recommended (but not required):

- Golder, Matt. 2003. Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. *Comparative Political Studies* 36(4):432-466.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press. (Chapter 6, and 15, pp.90-115 and 258-274).
- Powell, G. Bingham. 2009. "The Ideological Congruence Controversy: The Impact of Alternative Measures, Data, and Time Periods on the Effects of Election Rules." *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 42:1475-1497.
- Farrell, David M. 2011. *Electoral Systems. A Comparative Introduction*. Palgrave, (chapter 10 pp.213-230).

### **WEEK 8 (November 25): Centripetal vs. Centrifugal effects**

#### Required readings:

- \*Cox, Gary W. 1990 "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems" *American Journal of Political Science* 34(4):903-935.
- Dow, Jay K. 2001. "A Comparative Spatial Analysis of Majoritarian and Proportional Elections." *Electoral Studies* 20: 109-25.
- \*Calvo, Ernesto, and Timothy Hellwig. 2011. "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives under Different Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(1):27-41.
- Ezrow, Lawrence. 2011. "Electoral System and Party Responsiveness" in Norman Schofield, and Gonzalo Caballero, *Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting*, Springer.

#### Recommended (but not required):

- King, Gary. 1990. "Electoral Responsiveness and Partisan Bias in Multiparty Democracies." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 15: 159-181.
- Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2006. Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others." *American Political Science Review* 100(2), pp. 165-181.
- Ezrow, Lawrence. 2005. "Are Moderate Parties Rewarded in Multiparty Systems? A Pooled Analysis of Western European Elections, 1984-98." *European Journal of Political Science* 44(6): 881-98.
- Ezrow, Lawrence. 2008. "Parties' Policy Programmes and the Dog That Didn't" *British Journal of Political Science* 38(3): 479-97



## **WEEK 9 (December 2): Citizen Behavior and Attitudes: Turnout**

### Required readings:

- \*Endersby, James W., Kreickhaus, Jonathan T. 2008. Turnout around the Globe: The Influence of Electoral Institutions on National Voter Participation, 1972-2000. *Electoral Studies* 27:601-610.
- \*Franklin, Mark N. 1999. Electoral Engineering and Cross-National Turnout Differences: What Role for Compulsory Voting? *British Journal of Political Science* 29(1):205-216.
- Eggers, Andrew C. 2014. "Proportionality and Turnout. Evidence from French Municipalities." *Comparative Political Studies* (Forthcoming).
- \*Taagepera, Rein, Peter Selb, and Bernard Grofman. 2014. "How Turnout Depends on the Number of Parties: A Logical Model." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 24(4):393-413.

### Recommended (but not required):

- Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, (Chapter 7, pp.151-178).
- Singh, Shane. 2010. Contradictory Calculi: Differences in Individual's Turnout Decisions across Electoral Systems. *Political Research Quarterly* (Forthcoming).
- Banducci, Susan, Karp, Jeffrey. 2009. Electoral Systems, Efficacy and Voter Turnout. In H.D. Klingemann, *The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cho, Wonbin, and Michael Bratton. 2006. "Electoral Institutions, Partisan Status, and Political Support in Lesotho." *Electoral Studies* 25(4): 731-50.
- Farrell, David M., and Ian McAllister. 2006. "Voter Satisfaction and Electoral Systems: Does Preferential Voting in Candidate-Centred Systems Make a Difference?" *European Journal of Political Research* 45(5): 723-49.
- Blais, Andre, and Kees Aarts. 2006. "Electoral Systems and Turnout." *Acta Politica* 41(2): 180-96.
- Geys, Benny. 2006. "Explaining Voter Turnout: A Review of Aggregate-level Research." *Electoral Studies* 25(4): 637-63.

## **WEEK 10 (December 9): Mixed Systems: dynamics and contamination**

### Required readings:

- \*Massicotte, Louis, and André Blais. 1999. "Mixed Electoral Systems: a conceptual and empirical survey." *Electoral Studies* 18(3):341-366.
- \*Cox, Karen E., and Leonard J. Schoppa. 2002. "Interaction Effects in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. Theory and Evidence from Germany, Japan and Italy." *Comparative Political Studies*. 35(9):1027-1053.
- Moser, Robert G. and Ethan Scheiner. 2012. *Electoral systems and Political Context: How the Effects of Rules Vary across New and Established Democracies*. Cambridge University Press, (chapters 1-4.)

### Recommended (but not required):

- Shugart, Matthew S. and Martin P. Wattenberg (Eds.) 2001. *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?* Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapters 1-2.
- Farrell, David M. 2011. *Electoral Systems. A Comparative Introduction*. Palgrave, (chapter 5, pp.93-118).
- Fortin-Rittberger, Jessica & Christina Eder. 2013. "Towards a Gender-equal Bundestag? The Impact of Electoral Rules on Women's Representation." *West European Politics*. Volume 36(5): 969-985.
- Herron, Erik S., and Misa Nishikawa. 2001. "Contamination effects and the number of parties in mixed-superposition electoral systems." *Electoral Studies* 20:63-86.

### **WEEK 11 (December 16): strategic voting/entry**

#### Required readings:

- \*Cox, Gary W. 1999. "Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 145-161.
- \*Ferrara, Federico, and Erik S. Herron. 2005. "Going at it alone? Strategic Entry under Mixed Electoral Rules." *American Journal of Political Science*. 49(1):16-31
- \*Gschwend, Thomas. 2007. "Ticket-splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules: Evidence from Germany." *Electoral Studies* 46(1):1-23.
- Hermann, Michael. 2012. "Voter Uncertainty and Failure of Duverger's Law: an Empirical Analysis" *Public Choice* 151:63-90.

#### Recommended (but not required):

- Gary W. Cox, *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chs. 1-4, 8, and 15.
- Moser, Robert G. and Ethan Scheiner. 2009. "Strategic voting in established and new democracies: Ticket splitting in mixed-member electoral systems." *Electoral Studies*: 51-61
- Moser, Robert G. and Ethan Scheiner. 2012. *Electoral systems and Political Context: How the Effects of Rules Vary across New and Established Democracies*. Cambridge University Press, chapters 5-6.
- Blais, André, Romain Lachat, Airo Hino, Pascal Doray-Demers. 2011. "The Mechanical and Psychological Effects of Electoral Systems. A Quasi Experimental Study." *Comparative Political Studies* 44(12):1599-1621.

### **WEEK 12 (January 13): Intra-Party Competition/Legislative Behavior**

#### Required readings:

- \*Carey, John and Matthew S. Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas." *Electoral Studies* 14:417-439.
- \*Hix, Simon. 2004. "Electoral institutions and Legislative Behavior. Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament." *World Politics*, Vol. 56 194-223
- Sieberer, Ulrich. 2010. "Behavioral Consequences of Mixed Electoral Systems: Deviating Voting Behavior of District and List MPs in the German Bundestag." *Electoral Studies*

#### Recommended (but not required):

- Carey, John M. 2007. "Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol.51(1): 92-107.
- Jun, Hae-Won, and Simon Hix. 2010. "Electoral Systems, Political Career Paths and Legislative Behavior: Evidence from South Korea's Mixed-Member System." *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, Vol.11(2):153-171.
- Jones, Mark P., Saiegh, Sebastian, Spiller, Pablo T., and Mariano Tommasi. 2002. "Amateur Legislators-Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System." *American Journal of Political Science*, vol.36(3):656-669.
- Nemoto, Kuniaki, and Matthew S. Shugart. 2012. Localism and coordination under three different electoral systems: The national district of the Japanese House of Councillors." *Electoral Studies*, Vol.32(1): 1-12.
- Stratmann, Thomas et al. (2002) "Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German Bundestag: How Incentives to Pork-Barrel Differ Across Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science*: 46:3.

### **WEEK 13 (January 20): Fraud**

#### Required readings:

- \*Kunicova, Jana, and Susan Rose-Ackerman. 2005. Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption. *British Journal of Political Science* 35:573-606.
- \*Chang, Eric C., Golden, Miriam A. 2007. Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption. *British Journal of Political Science* 37(1):115-137.

- Charron, Nicholas. 2011. "Party Systems, Electoral Systems and Constraints on Corruption" *Electoral Studies* 30(4):595-606.

Recommended (but not required):

- Persson, Thorsten, G. Tabellini, and F. Trebbi. 2003. Electoral Rules and Corruption. *Journal of the European Economic Association* 1(4):958-989.
- Golden, Miriam. 2003. Electoral Connections: The Effects of the Personal Vote on Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Legislation in Postwar Italy. *British Journal of Political Science* 33:189-212.
- Brown, David S., Touchton Michael, and Andrew Whitford. 2011. "Political Polarization as a Constraint on Corruption: A Cross National Comparison" *World Development* 39(9):1516-1529.

**WEEK 14 (January 27): Electoral system design for new democracies and divided societies**

Required readings:

- \*Barkan, Joel D. 1995. "Elections in Agrarian Societies." *Journal of Democracy* 6(4):106-116.
- \*Lijphart, Arend. 1996 "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies." in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, pp.163-174
- \*Lardeyret, Guy. 1996. "The Problem with PR." in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 175-180.
- \*Reilly, Benjamin. 2002. "Electoral Systems for Divided Societies." *Journal of Democracy* 13(2): 156-170.
- 2013. "Symposium: Between Science and Engineering: Reflections of the APSA Presidential Task Force on Political Science, Electoral Rules, and Democratic Governance." *Perspectives on Politics* 11(3): 808-840 (all contributions).

Recommended (but not required):

- Ferree, K. E., Powell, G. B., & Scheiner, E. 2014. "Context, Electoral Rules, and Party Systems." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17(1), 421-439.
- Horowitz, Donald. L. 2003. "Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers," *Journal of Democracy* 14(4):32-46.
- Taagepera, Rein. 1998. "How Electoral Systems Matter for Democratization." *Democratization*. 5(3):68-91.
- Mozaffar, Shaheen, James R. Scarritt, and Glen Galaich. 2003. "Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 97(3): 379-90.
- Reilly, Benjamin and Andrew Reynolds. 1999. *Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies* Washington: National Academy Press.
- Doorenspleet, R. 2005. "Electoral Systems and Democratic Quality: Do Mixed Systems Combine the Best or the Worst of Both Worlds? An Explorative Quantitative Cross-National Study." *Acta Politica* 40(1): 28-49.